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Felons represent a large majority of disenfranchised adult Americans, 
with a significant proportion remaining unable to vote even after completing 
the entirety of their sentences.  As voter eligibility requirements become an 
increasingly contested partisan battlefield, the fate of these disenfranchised in-
dividuals has become increasingly unclear.  With this backdrop in mind, we 
consider recent developments in felon disenfranchisement, the prospects for 
future legislative action, and the legal arguments that litigants might employ 
to challenge the practice.  In so doing, we exploit newly collected polling data 
to determine (1) whether Americans are ready to end felon disenfranchisement, 
and (2) under what circumstances they believe felon disenfranchisement con-
stitutes excessive punishment.  Examining these results, we conclude that the 
prospects for an immediate end to felon disenfranchisement are limited and 
that a categorical challenge to disenfranchisement under the Eighth Amend-
ment would be doomed to fail.  However, our results do suggest that a limited 
set of “gross disproportionality” challenges could plausibly succeed in states 
with lifetime disenfranchisement laws.  We finish by discussing the disparate 
impact of disenfranchisement laws on African-Americans and consider the 
prospects for challenging these laws under the Voting Rights Act. 
  
  
* Bruce E. Cain is a Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and the Spence 
and Cleone Eccles Family Director of the Bill Lane Center for the American West.  
Brett Parker is a JD-PhD student at Stanford University.  The authors gratefully 
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view.  All mistakes are the authors’ own. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2018, Floridians voted to eliminate lifetime disenfranchisement for all 
felons, leaving Iowa and Kentucky as the only states to continue the practice.1  
Florida’s most popular newspapers all endorsed the campaign, with several 
publishing lengthy discussions of the subject.2  These editorials focused much 
of their criticism on two characteristics of Florida’s existing law: its exces-
sively punitive nature and its disparate racial impact.  The Tampa Bay Times 
opened its piece by discussing the lives of former felons convicted of minor 
crimes before concluding that Florida’s disenfranchisement rules “serve[] no 
purpose but to perpetually punish them.”3  The Palm Beach Post focused in-
stead on the racial implications of disenfranchisement, observing, “[T]he out-
rageous reality is that more than one in five voting-age blacks can’t vote in 
Florida, compared with about one in 10 voters in the state’s general popula-
tion.”4  The Miami Herald bluntly summarized both sentiments in four words: 
“It’s unfair, it’s racist.”5 
These two arguments – that felon disenfranchisement constitutes dispro-
portionate punishment and discriminates against racial minorities – are among 
the most frequently cited in public debates over the practice.6  They also map 
  
 1. Criminal Disenfranchisement Laws Across the United States, BRENNAN CTR. 
FOR JUST. (May 30, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/criminal-disenfranchise-
ment-laws-across-united-states [perma.cc/CK62-AM35]. 
 2. Editorial, Time to Restore Voting Rights to 1.5 Million Floridians; ‘Yes’ on 
Amendment 3, PALM BEACH POST (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.mypalm-
beachpost.com/news/opinion/editorial-time-restore-voting-rights-million-floridi-
ans/idec3l9Z18nSRxtXrukA9O/ [perma.cc/WL6Y-UWZB]; Editorial, Florida's Elec-
tion 2018: Our Endorsements for Governor, U.S. Senate, U.S. House and the Amend-
ments, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/opin-
ion/editorials/os-op-orlando-sentinel-endorsements-20181018-html-
story.html#amend1 [perma.cc/87NS-HN7Q]; Editorial, Learn How 12 Florida Amend-
ments Affect your Life, and Your Wallet, Before You Vote, MIAMI HERALD (Oct. 7, 
2018), https://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/editorials/article219635000.html; Edi-
torial, Five Good — Seven Bad — Amendments for Florida’s Constitution, SUN 
SENTINEL (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/opinion/endorsements/fl-op-
end-good-bad-constitutional-amendments-20181005-story.html [perma.cc/R55K-
3V9T]; Editorial, Times Recommends: Yes on Amendment 4, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Oct. 
3, 2018), http://www.tampabay.com/opinion/editorials/times-recommends-yes-on-
amendment-4-20180928/ [perma.cc/ULS6-KTYT]. 
 3. Editorial, TAMPA BAY TIMES, supra note 2. 
 4. Editorial, PALM BEACH POST, supra note 2. 
 5. Editorial, MIAMI HERALD, supra note 2. 
 6. See, e.g., Luke Darby, Pete Buttigieg Says Incarcerated People Shouldn't Get 
to Vote, GQ (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.gq.com/story/pete-buttigieg-voting-rights 
[perma.cc/FP2A-JEFR] (quoting Mayor of South Bend, Indiana Pete Buttigieg: 
“Frankly, I think the motivations for preventing that kind of reenfranchisement, in some 
cases, have to do with one side of the aisle noticing that they politically benefit from 
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neatly onto prominent legal and legislative challenges to felon disenfranchise-
ment.  Both scholars and litigants have asserted that felon disenfranchisement 
constitutes an “excessive” sanction in violation of the Eighth Amendment;7 
similarly, they have claimed that these laws violate Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”) and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.8 
Felon disenfranchisement is not a monolith, however.  States vary tre-
mendously in what felonies they punish with disenfranchisement;9 how long 
disenfranchisement lasts;10 and what process ex-cons must go through to seek 
  
that. And that's got some racial layers too.”); Brianne Pfannenstiel, Gov. Kim Reynolds 
to Propose Constitutional Amendment Lifting Felon Voting Ban in Condition of the 
State, DES MOINES REGISTER (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.desmoinesregis-
ter.com/story/news/ 
politics/2019/01/15/kim-reynolds-felon-voting-rights-constitutional-amendment-lift-
ban-iowa-legislature-proposal-2019/2572308002/ [perma.cc/Z9EZ-YDN2] (quoting 
Iowa’s Republican Governor Kim Reynolds on her support for softening Iowa’s disen-
franchisement law: “I believe that people make mistakes and there’s opportunities to 
change, and that needs to be recognized. So it’s something that I’m passionate about.”).  
A third argument against disenfranchisement – that the right to vote can never be denied 
under any circumstances – has been floated by some.  See, e.g., Sydney Ember & Matt 
Stevens, Sanders Backs Voting Rights for All Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2019, at 
A25 (describing Democratic presidential candidate Bernie Sanders’ opinion that “the 
right to vote is inherent to our democracy . . . Yes, even for terrible people”).  However, 
it has almost no traction among the general population; only 17% of Americans believe 
that all individuals should be able to vote under all circumstances.  Kathy Frankovic, 
Should Felons Be Allowed to Vote in America?, YOUGOV (May 07, 2019, 10:30 AM), 
https://today.yougov.com/topics/politics/articles-reports/2019/05/07/should-felons-be-
allowed-vote-america [perma.cc/2ZJ2-MHKG]. 
 7. See, e.g., Thompson v. Alabama, 293 F. Supp. 3d 1313, 1328 (M.D. Ala. 
2017); Thiess v. State Admin. Bd. of Elections Laws, 387 F. Supp. 1038, 1041–42 (D. 
Md. 1974); Pamala S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, 
and the Debate Over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1165–69 
(2004) (suggesting that punitive disenfranchisement violates the Eighth Amendment). 
 8. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 55–56 (1974) (holding that felon disen-
franchisement does not violate Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Farrakhan v. 
Gregoire, 623 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding that only evidence of inten-
tional discrimination in the criminal justice system could give rise to a Section 2 VRA 
claim); Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 35–36 (1st Cir. 2009) (determining that chal-
lenges to felon disenfranchisement are not cognizable under the VRA); Hayden v. 
Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 329 (2d Cir. 2006) (en banc); Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 
F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 9. Compare ALA. CODE § 17-3-30.1(c) (2019) (providing an extensive list 
“crimes of moral turpitude” warranting permanent disenfranchisement) with MD. CODE 
ANN., ELEC. LAW § 2-103(b)(3) (West 2019) (permanently disenfranchising only those 
convicted of buying and selling votes). 
 10. Compare MASS. CONST. art. III (disenfranchising only those currently in 
prison) with KY. CONST. § 145.1 (permanently disenfranchising all felons). 
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restoration of their voting rights.11  At one extreme, Iowa and Kentucky per-
manently disenfranchise all felons unless their rights are individually restored 
by the governor.12  On the other end of the spectrum, felons in Maine and Ver-
mont are never disenfranchised and are permitted to vote while in prison.13   
Disenfranchisement practice has also changed with some frequency, often 
in the direction of greater ballot access.  Twenty-three states since 1997 have 
moved towards restoring the voting rights of individuals who have been con-
victed of felonies.14  But as restrictive voting laws generally have become a 
weapon of electoral advantage on a partisan battleground, the trend toward eas-
ing existing felon voting restrictions may be losing momentum and could even 
reverse direction in the future.  We have already seen one prominent example 
of recession.  Six months after eliminating its permanent felon disenfranchise-
ment law, Florida’s House passed HB 7089, a bill that would delay the resto-
ration of voting rights until an ex-felon’s outstanding financial obligations are 
resolved.15 
It is against this backdrop that we evaluate the political and legal pro-
spects of restoring felon voting rights.  Is there sufficient public support for 
removing more of the existing restrictions, and if so, which ones?  Are Eighth 
Amendment challenges likely to succeed against the practice of permanently 
disenfranchising felons, and if so, to what degree?  And in the wake of recent 
Court decisions concerning the VRA, does that statute provide adequate pro-
tection against politically motivated efforts to roll back felon voting rights?  
In examining these questions, we draw extensively on a new survey of 
public attitudes on this topic conducted in conjunction with YouGov (herein-
after “the May Survey”).16  We find that most of the public is still resistant 
  
 11. Compare NEV. REV. STAT. § 213.157 (West 2019) (providing for automatic 
reenfranchisement of those released from prison) with KY. § 431.073(2)(b), (10), (11) 
(2019) (allowing those convicted of certain minor crimes to escape the state constitu-
tion’s permanent disenfranchisement provision, but only upon making a formal request 
in court and paying $300 in filing fees). 
 12. See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., supra note 1; but see KY. § 431.073(2)(b), (10), 
(11) (2019) (providing that Kentucky felons can sometimes expunge minor convictions 
and accordingly regain their voting rights). 
 13. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., supra at note 1. 
 14. See Morgan McLeod, Expanding the Vote, THE SENT’G PROJECT 4 (2018). 
 15. See Patricia Mazzei, Ex-Felons in Florida Have the Right to Vote, but It’s Not 
That Simple, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2019, at A11 (detailing the new restrictions). 
 16. YouGov administered our survey questions to 2,000 nationally representative 
respondents between May 3 and 6, 2019.  It then weighted the responses by various 
demographic criteria – including gender, race, and age – to improve precision.  YouGov 
is an internationally recognized public opinion and data company frequently com-
mended for its accuracy. See, e.g., Courtney Kennedy et al., Evaluating Online 
Nonprobability Surveys, PEW RES. CTR. (May 2, 2016) https://www.pewre-
search.org/methods/2016/05/02/evaluating-online-nonprobability-surveys/ 
[perma.cc/7BPU-Z3KF] (comparing various online polling firms and finding that 
YouGov consistently outperforms its competitors).  Respondents were 48% male, 52% 
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towards ending felon voting restrictions entirely and that a majority is still hes-
itant to allow those on probation and parole to vote.  Moreover, we observe that 
perceptions of party advantage may be polarizing – and therefore hardening – 
views about felon voting rights, which will greatly complicate the chances of 
forging a bipartisan consensus on this matter.  With respect to change via the 
legal system, we conclude that “excessive punishment” claims under the Eighth 
Amendment can be powerful but only when presented on behalf of low-level 
ex-offenders facing extensive periods of disenfranchisement.  The dispropor-
tionate effect that these laws have on minority communities shows there is 
room for discrimination-based claims in felon disenfranchisement cases, but 
the recent neutering of Section 5 of the VRA has removed a powerful line of 
defense against any future attempts to roll back felon voting rights.  
With these topics in mind, we have organized the remainder of this piece 
into three parts.  In Part I, we focus on the likelihood of legislative action given 
the viewpoints on this issue that our survey respondents revealed.  In Part II, 
we consider the viability of legal claims based on the “excessive punishment” 
paradigm, particularly with regard to the lifetime disenfranchisement laws all 
felons face in Kentucky and Iowa.  However, given the limited scope of Eighth 
Amendment legal challenges, we devote Part III to discussing the broader dis-
parate impact problem inherent in this country’s felon disenfranchisement 
practices. 
PART I: PUBLIC ATTITUDES AND THE CHANGING CONTEXT OF FELON 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
Changes in U.S. politics over the last few decades have framed and 
shaped the felon disenfranchisement issue in crucial ways.  Specifically, U.S. 
electoral politics has become more professionalized, polarized, and closely 
contested.17  Professionalization refers to the rising importance of paid, full-
time political consultants.  While campaigns for office at the federal, state, and 
city level still recruit and mobilize volunteers to contact voters and perform 
  
female; 70% White, 13% Black, 12% Hispanic, 6% other; and 22% under age 30, 24% 
age 30-44, 34% age 45-64, and 21% aged 65 or above.  The maximum margin of error 
for our poll was 1.1 percentage points, and the results on commonly-asked questioned 
paralleled those obtained by other surveys.  See infra note 36. 
 17. See, e.g., Morris Fiorina, Divided Government in the American States: A By-
product of Legislative Professionalism?, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 304, 306 (1994) (noting 
an increase in the number of full-time state legislators and a drop in voluntary seat 
turnover in state legislatures); Shanto Iyengar & Sean Westwood, Fear and Loathing 
Across Party Lines: New Evidence on Group Polarization, 59 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 690, 
691–92 (2015) (discussing the strength of affective political polarization in the United 
States); Jonathan Wand, Private Interests Financing Public Elections: Transforming 
Economic Battles into Partisan Politics, 10–11 (2013), https://www.jonathan-
wand.org/pdf/campaign-finance-1.pdf [perma.cc/CMY5-T8AT] (describing the in-
crease in competition for majority control in the U.S. House of Representatives). 
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various administrative functions in campaign offices, candidates rely on pro-
fessionals to do the polling, fundraising, media-buying, event-planning, higher-
level management, and campaign strategy formulation.  This has driven up the 
costs of campaigning and put more pressure on candidates to fundraise.  More 
to the point (at least in the context of felon voting restrictions), it has also con-
tributed to a winning-above-all mindset that embraces gaming election rules 
for political advantage.18 
Grassroots activists and volunteers tend to prioritize issues and value per-
sonal ties to the candidate.19  For professional consultants, however, campaigns 
are a business.  Consultants take a more instrumental approach to elections – 
they emphasize winning, staying in business, and building a reputation for be-
ing successful above pursuing losing ideological causes.  As the campaign con-
sultant class has grown, the instrumental ethos has become more pervasive, 
contributing to a disturbing trend in recent politics: namely, manipulating voter 
qualification and election administration rules to favor client candidates and 
party organizations.20  In some idealized world, all eligible citizens would en-
gage with campaigns and candidates would try to persuade them to vote for 
them.  In the U.S., however, this vision remains unrealized.  Electoral partici-
pation is far from universal and can be raised or lowered by changing voting 
rules and qualifications.21  As such, while candidates will go out of their way 
to encourage likely supporters to register and vote, they are also inclined to 
discourage their opponents from participating.  One way to achieve the latter 
is to tighten eligibility rules in targeted ways.   
The political professionalization trend coincides with another: the in-
creasing partisan polarization of American politics.  Starting in the 1960s but 
  
 18. See, e.g., Patricia Mazzei, Florida Limits Ex-Felon Voting, Prompting a Law-
suit and Cries of ‘Poll Tax’, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2019, at A16 (detailing Florida Re-
publicans’ efforts to limit the effect of Amendment 4, which restored voting rights to 
predominantly Democratic ex-felons); N.C. Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 
F.3d 204, 227–29 (4th Cir. 2016) (describing Republican efforts to limit black turnout 
in North Carolina in the aftermath of Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013)); 
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2491 (2019) (recounting Republican efforts 
to gerrymander North Carolina congressional districts). 
 19. See EMILLIE VAN HAUTE & ANKIA GAUJA, PARTY MEMBERS AND ACTIVISTS 
7–8 (2008); Henry Brady et al., Prospecting for Participants: Rational Expectations 
and the Recruitment of Political Activists, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 153, 155 (1999); Ed-
mond Costantini & Joel King, The Motives of Political Party Activists: A Factor-Ana-
lytic Exploration, 6 POL. BEHAV. 79, 80–81 (1984). 
 20. See Mazzei, supra note 18, at A16. 
 21. See, e.g., Anthony Fowler, Electoral and Policy Consequences of Voter Turn-
out: Evidence from Compulsory Voting in Australia, 8 QUARTERLY J. POL. SCI. 159, 
171 (2013) (estimating the impact of mandatory voting laws in Australia); Stephen An-
solabehere, Effects of Identification Requirements on Voting: Evidence from the Expe-
riences of Voters on Election Day, 42 POL. SCI. & POLS. 127, 128 (2009) (finding that 
African Americans and Hispanic voters are disproportionately likely to be asked for 
voter ID when showing up to vote). 
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accelerating through the Reagan Administration, the two major parties have 
sorted along racial and ideological lines.22  Divergence between the median 
Democratic and Republican policy positions has widened substantially in both 
Congress and state legislatures, and political elites tend to cluster at opposite 
ends of the ideological spectrum.23  This trend has two important effects.  First, 
it has raised the policy stakes of being in power – or at least being in position 
to block the other party’s policy in a divided government situation.  Second, by 
racializing the divide between the parties, partisan polarization has conflated 
party and racial interests.24  As a result, tactics that expand or restrict voter 
eligibility along partisan lines implicitly serve divergent policy and racial in-
terests.  Expanding voter eligibility tends to help the increasingly nonwhite 
Democratic Party and restricting it tends to help the predominantly white Re-
publican Party.25   
The last distinctive element of contemporary U.S. politics is the close 
contestation between the two major parties.  Control of the House of Repre-
sentatives has changed hands four times since 1992, and no presidential elec-
tion during that period has been decided by more than ten percentage points.26  
These circumstances enhance the urgency to find every possible electoral ad-
vantage.  When one party is in a dominant position, small differences in the 
vote matter less.  But in highly competitive situations like the one that prevails 
today, winning a few seats with a small tactical shift can alter the party control 
of state and Congressional chambers.  The aforementioned polarization can re-
sult in large swings in policy and incentivize further electoral rule changes that 
  
 22. See generally MORRIS FIORINA, UNSTABLE MAJORITIES: POLARIZATION, 
PARTY SORTING, AND POLITICAL STALEMATE (2017) (discussing party sorting at 
length); see also Morris Fiorina et al., Polarization in the American Public: Miscon-
ceptions and Misreadings, 70 J. OF POL. 556, 558 (2008) (discussing party sorting along 
ideological lines). 
 23. See Morris Fiorina, Has the American Public Polarized, HOOVER INST. 2–3, 
fig. 1 (2016) (illustrating the extent of elite polarization in the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives and discussing elite polarization in state legislatures). 
 24. See N.C. Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 227–29 (4th Cir. 
2016) (discussing the substantial correlation between limiting African American votes 
and Republican political advantage). 
 25. State-by-State Data, THE SENT’G PROJECT, https://www.sentencingpro-
ject.org/the-facts/#detail?state1Option=U.S.%20Total&state2Option=0 
[perma.cc/KX8A-MWEF] (last visited July 1, 2019) (African American disenfran-
chisement rates exceed general disenfranchisement rates in all states with felon disen-
franchisement); see also infra Figure 5.   
 26. United States Presidential Election Results, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/United-States-Presidential-Election-Results-
1788863 [perma.cc/S62V-W86T] (last visited July 1, 2019); Party Divisions of the 
House of Representatives, 1789 to Present, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
https://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/Party-Divisions/ 
[perma.cc/GVA9-L8SS] (last visited July 1, 2019). 
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enhance the prospects of building or maintaining single party control – a double 
bottom political line of policy and political interest. 
Viewed historically, of course, election laws have been manipulated since 
the earliest days of electoral politics.  At times, the U.S. has made progress in 
limiting this kind of gamesmanship.  Progressive era reforms, the civil rights 
movement, and post-World War II bipartisanship combined to create a super-
majoritarian commitment to eliminate many of the more blatant and often ra-
cialized forms of suffrage denial such as literacy tests, poll taxes, and district 
malapportionment.27  What distinguishes the new election administration bat-
tles is the stronger pretextual cover that protecting electoral integrity and pre-
venting voter fraud has provided.  These seemingly neutral goals have served 
as justifications for imposing stricter voter identification requirements, more 
aggressive voter caging, more difficult registration procedures, and the like.28  
In addition, because party and racial interests align more perfectly than in the 
immediate post-war period, it is harder to disentangle racial and political mo-
tives and effects than it was in the past.29  This shift matters because it has 
undermined any bipartisan Congressional commitment to amend the VRA to 
deal with these problems.30 
Recent trends in felon disenfranchisement laws must be considered in 
light of this context.  If one is committed to the goal of full political participa-
tion, the arc of the law over recent decades seems facially encouraging.  Since 
1997, twenty-three states have made policy changes that have restored voting 
rights to some degree for those convicted of crimes.31  Only two states still have 
permanent disenfranchisement laws for all felons and only two do not restrict 
felon voting rights in some manner.32  Most state policies fall somewhere be-
tween the extremes, either only permanently disenfranchising some felons for 
certain crimes or restoring voting rights at various stages in the rehabilitation 
  
 27. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1 (banning the federal poll tax); Voting Rights 
Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (banning literacy tests and other devices 
aimed at disenfranchising African Americans); Harper v. Virginia St. Bd. of Elections, 
383 U.S. 663, 683 (1966) (ruling the state poll tax unconstitutional); Lucas v. Forty-
Fourth General Assemb., 377 U.S. 713, 738 (1964) (requiring all state legislative dis-
tricts – including state senates – to be apportioned primarily on the basis of population). 
 28. See Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 191, 194–97, 203–
204 (2008) (opinion of Stevens, J.) (discussing Indiana’s interest in enacting a voter ID 
law and the partisan dimensions of the dispute and holding that the state’s interest was 
“sufficiently strong” to justify the law); N.C. Conference of NAACP, 831 F.3d at 217–
18; Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Republican Nat’l Comm., 673 F.3d 192, 196–201 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (describing voter caging efforts by the Republican National Committee). 
 29. See N.C. Conference of NAACP, 831 F.3d at 217–18. 
 30. See Jennifer Steinhauer, Mitch McConnell’s Commitment to Civil Rights Sets 
Him Apart, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2015, at A11 (discussing Republican opposition to 
reauthorizing the VRA). 
 31. See generally McLeod, supra note 14. 
 32. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., supra note 1.  
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process (parole, probation, and completed sentence).33  But the broader recent 
trend in voting rights is less encouraging.  Twenty-five states have imposed 
various kinds of voting restrictions since 2010, including three states that re-
treated on felon disenfranchisement (Iowa, Kentucky, and Florida).34 
So, what are the prospects for a broad restoration of felon voting rights 
going forward?  Based on the May Survey of voter attitudes on this topic, pro-
spects for broad restoration seem limited at best and potentially ripe for retro-
gression at worst.  As previous studies have found, our survey respondents did 
not favor letting felons vote while they are incarcerated – 56% were opposed 
to it and 27% were in favor.  There also was no majority support for restoring 
felon voting rights before they completed their sentences: only 33% favored 
letting convicted felons vote at some point during the parole or probation stages 
of their sentences (as compared to 50% who thought otherwise).35  
Our results also suggest that any effort to remove felon voting restrictions 
will likely hinge on the nature of the crime.  In the May Survey, we asked 
respondents whether they thought various forms of disenfranchisement were 
“too harsh” or “appropriate.”  The aim of these questions was not to determine 
whether a respondent favored a particular disenfranchisement law but merely 
to assess whether they considered it to be a permissible punishment given the 
circumstances.  We inquired specifically about three representative crimes – 
drug possession, illegal stock trading, and sexual assault – and about three 
types of disenfranchisement: (a) a lifetime voting ban, (b) a bar on voting while 
on probation and parole, and (c) a bar on voting while in prison.  Figures 1(a), 
(b), and (c) below summarize the results of these inquiries. 
 
  
 33. Id. 
 34. See New Voting Restrictions in America, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., (Oct. 1, 
2019) https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/new-voting-re-
strictions-america [perma.cc/ES9S-V5Q4]; see also Ky. Exec. Order No. 2015-052 
(Dec. 22, 2015). 
 35. See supra note 16 (figures come from our own polling).  For comparable fig-
ures from other surveys, see infra note 36. 
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As this graphic implies, Americans generally do not consider disenfran-
chisement to be “too harsh” under most circumstances.  A majority of Ameri-
cans only consider permanent voting bans for drug possession and illegal stock 
trading to be excessively punitive.  To be clear, these statistics do not suggest 
that Americans support these forms of disenfranchisement as a matter of pol-
icy.  Our polling indicates that only 20% of respondents believe that ex-felons 
should be permanently barred from voting, which is directly in line with what 
older surveys have found.36  The numbers do indicate, however, that there is 
  
 36. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF KENTUCKY, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN 
THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY 2 (2019); Barbara Rodriguez and Stephen Gruber-
Miller, Iowa Poll: Nearly Two-Thirds of Iowans Say Felons Should Regain Voting 
Rights After Completing Sentences, DES MOINES REG. (Feb. 16, 2019, 6:00 PM), 
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no national consensus about the disproportionality of disenfranchisement as a 
general matter.  Taken together with the aforementioned polling on non-per-
manent disenfranchisement, they further imply that the public is relatively con-
tent with laws disenfranchising felons while they serve their sentence.   
In addition to some resistance to further loosening restrictions on felon 
voting, our polling provides evidence of partisan polarization among citizens 
on this issue that might give license to politicians and consultants who see po-
tential tactical advantages in restricting felon voting rights.  We asked several 
questions regarding this topic.  One inquired about which party stood to benefit 
more from restoring voting rights to felons.  As Table 1 below shows, our re-
spondents selected the Democrats by a 4 to 1 margin. 
 
TABLE 1 
The Democratic Party The Republican Party Not Sure 
47.6% 11.7% 40.7% 
N = 1990 
a Question: Some states have recently passed laws restoring voting rights to those con-
victed of felonies. Which party do you think has more to gain from these laws? 
 
TABLE 2 
SUPPORT FOR PERMANENT DISENFRANCHISEMENT AMONG REPUBLICANS 
Support Among Those Be-
lieving Democrats Have 
More to Gain 
Support Among Those Be-
lieving Republicans Have 
More to Gain 
Support Among Those 
Who Aren’t Sure Who Has 
More to Gain 
38.5% 17.9% 24.9% 
N = 525 
 
The perception that Democrats have more to gain appears to increase Re-
publican support for permanent disenfranchisement.  As Table 2 indicates, Re-
publicans who think that Democrats are more likely to benefit from restoring 
felon voting rights are 20% more likely to favor permanent disenfranchisement.  
In addition, when we rank-ordered policies ranging from permanent disenfran-
chisement to restoration of voting rights upon release, we find that party corre-




constitution/2875580002/ [perma.cc/Z9EZ-YDN2]; Jeff Manza et al., Public Attitudes 
Toward Disenfranchisement in the United States, 68 PUB. OPINION Q. 275, 281 (2004). 
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tended to favor options on the restriction end of the continuum while Demo-
crats preferred the restoration end.37  
 
TABLE 3  
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTY, ATTITUDE, AND DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
OPINION 











% Increase in 
Probability  




% Increase in 
Probability of 
Favoring  
FD Until  
Released from  
Incarceration 
Punish-
ment = 1 
-12.242% -4.18% 3.79% 12.63% 
Ind. = 1 4.94% 5.73% -1.27% -9.40% 
Rep. = 1 13.99% 4.62% -4.67% -13.94% 
Punish-
ment x 
Ind. = 1 
-.74% -.23% .21% .77% 
Punish-
ment x 
Rep. = 1 
9.28% 1.44% -2.76% -7.96% 
FD = Felon Disenfranchisement, Ind. = Independent, Rep. = Republican 
 
In sum, efforts to expand felon voting rights face serious public opinion 
obstacles that could prevent more than marginal changes.  The prospects for 
legislative advances will ultimately vary by state partisanship.  It will be easier 
to take further steps in states that lean strongly towards the Democrats and 
  
 37. Table 3 summarizes the results of an ordered logit regression of disenfran-
chisement policy on party and attitude towards disenfranchisement.  The respondent’s 
partisan identification (Democrat, Independent, or Republican) and opinion towards the 
purpose (either punishment or character) served as the independent variables, while the 
four policy options listed below served as the dependent variables.  Since the regression 
coefficients from an ordered logit are difficult to interpret, we have translated them into 
percentages in the Table below.  The reference categories (that is, what the percentages 
represent increases over) are “Democrat” and belief that disenfranchisement is about 
character, not punishment.  As the statistics in row (3) suggest, Republicans were sub-
stantially more likely than other respondents to favor restrictive disenfranchisement 
policies.  Being a Republican (as opposed to a Democrat) increased by about 14% the 
probability of favoring permanent disenfranchisement and lowered by nearly 14% the 
probability of favoring voting rights restoration upon release from prison.  Another in-
teresting relationship this Table betrays is that between opinions about the purpose of 
disenfranchisement and support for various policies.  Those who considered the pur-
pose of disenfranchisement to be punishment generally favored more liberal voting 
rights policies – by contrast, those who thought the purpose of disenfranchisement was 
to keep low character individuals away from the ballot box were much more likely to 
support restrictive laws.  We discuss this phenomenon further in Part II.   
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much more difficult in solidly Republican states.  The sharp partisan divide on 
this issue also suggests that, while some states may move forward on restoring 
felon voting rights, others will either stay with the status quo or could even 
impose more rigid restrictions.   There may be more regressions in battleground 
states like Florida and Iowa depending on who controls the state legislature or 
the whims of governors with the power to take unilateral executive actions.38  
We will return to the implications of these partisan dynamics in Part III.  First, 
however, we examine the prospects of prominent legal – rather than political – 
challenges to disenfranchisement practices. 
PART II: THE LIMITED PROTECTION OF EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
CHALLENGES 
In light of the recent political trends we discussed in Part I, it seems that 
political momentum towards restoring felon voting rights might soon stall out.  
The unreliability of legislative change increases the salience of potential legal 
avenues for relief.  In this Section, we consider Eighth Amendment challenges; 
in the next, we discuss claims based on the VRA. Part A discusses the initial 
obstacle to Eight Amendment challenges: the claim that disenfranchisement 
does not constitute punishment and is, therefore, beyond the reach of the Eighth 
Amendment.  Part B turns to the substance of the Eighth Amendment chal-
lenge.  There, we argue that a categorical challenge to felon disenfranchisement 
laws would almost positively fail but that certain “gross disproportionality” 
claims could be tenable under the right circumstances. 
A.  The Threshold Question: Is Disenfranchisement Punishment? 
The idea that the Eighth Amendment prohibits certain forms of felon dis-
enfranchisement is not new.  For decades, the Supreme Court of the United 
States has explicitly recognized that the Eighth Amendment “contains a ‘nar-
row proportionality principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital sentences,’”39 and 
scholars and litigants alike have sought to utilize this tool against felon disen-
franchisement.40  However, only two courts we are aware of have seriously 
  
 38. See, e.g., Ky. Exec. Order No. 2015-052 (Dec. 22, 2015). 
 39. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 
501 U.S. 957, 996–97 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment)) (plurality opinion). 
 40. For scholarly efforts, see, e.g., Sarah Grady, Civil Death is Different: An Ex-
amination of a Post-Graham Challenge to Felon Disenfranchisement Under the Eighth 
Amendment, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 441 (2012); Carl N. Frazier, Note, Re-
moving the Vestiges of Discrimination: Criminal Disenfranchisement Laws and Strat-
egies for Challenging Them, 95 KY. L.J. 481, 492 (2007); Karlan, supra note 7, at 22.  
For court cases, see, e.g., Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 450 (2d Cir. 1967); 
Thompson v. Alabama, 293 F. Supp. 3d 1313, 1329 (M.D. Ala. 2017); Thiess v. State 
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analyzed the substance of this claim;41 the rest have concluded that the Eighth 
Amendment is not applicable to these laws because felon disenfranchisement 
is not punitive in nature.42 
Crucially, however, the courts reaching this latter conclusion have rarely 
given this question serious consideration.  Instead, most have relied on cursory 
citations to ambiguous statements by appellate courts, particularly the Supreme 
Court’s dicta in Trop v. Dulles.43  In that case, Chief Justice Warren suggested 
that if the legislative purpose of disenfranchisement “is to designate a reason-
able ground of eligibility for voting” a law disenfranchising felons could 
stand.44  Often ignored, however, is that in the immediately preceding sentence, 
he affirmed that if disenfranchisement was “imposed for the purpose of pun-
ishing [felons], the statutes authorizing [it] . . . would be penal,” and by impli-
cation subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny.45  To the extent that courts place 
any reliance on this non-binding language – a potentially dubious proposition 
in light of contemporary understandings of voting rights46 – the clear path for-
ward is to examine the legislative intent behind disenfranchisement laws to de-
termine whether they are meant to punish.  The modern “intent-effects” doc-
trine – which establishes that a legislatively imposed penalty must be consid-
ered punishment if punishment was the legislative intent – confirms the neces-
sity of this endeavor.47 
Yet courts have almost uniformly ignored this task when presented with 
Eighth Amendment claims.  In its influential treatment of the subject in Green 
v. Board of Elections,48 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit mis-
stated Chief Justice Warren’s assessment of felon disenfranchisement.  Citing 
Trop, the Second Circuit concluded that “[d]epriving convicted felons of the 
franchise is not a punishment but rather is a ‘nonpenal exercise of the power to 
  
Admin. Bd. of Elections Laws, 387 F. Supp. 1038, 1041–42 (D. Md. 1974); Kronlund 
v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 74 (N.D. Ga. 1971). 
 41. Green, 380 F.2d at 450 (in dicta); Thiess, 387 F. Supp. at 1041–42. 
 42. Kronlund, 327 F. Supp. at 74; Green, 380 F.2d at 450; Fernandez v. Kiner, 
673 P.2d 191, 193 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983).  In Thompson, the court deferred discussion 
of this question to a later stage of the case. 293 F. Supp. 3d at 1329.  
 43. 356 U.S. 86, 96–97 (1958). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 96. 
 46. Karlan, supra note 7 at 1152–55. 
 47. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003).  As Smith makes clear, legislative intent 
is not the only means by which a law might be deemed punishment – if the statutory 
scheme is “so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the State's intention to 
deem it civil.” Id. (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  However, since the legislative purpose was demonstrably 
punishment in many of the cases discussed here, we focus primarily on intent. 
 48.  380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1967) 
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regulate the franchise.’”49  Subsequent decisions have either cited Green’s mis-
reading or repeated the mistake.  For example, in Kronlund v. Honstein,50 the 
court rejected the Eighth Amendment claim with a single inaccurate sentence: 
“the Supreme Court has held that disenfranchisement is a non-penal exercise 
of a State's power to regulate the vote and is not cruel and unusual punish-
ment.”51  Likewise, the courts in El-Amin v. McDonnell52 and King v. City of 
Boston53 considered the issue unworthy of a published opinion and declined to 
engage in the careful analysis of legislative intent necessary to decide the is-
sue.54  It is impossible to know why these courts eschewed more comprehen-
sive inquiries.  Given that the defendants in both cases served lengthy prison 
terms, perhaps the courts thought the Eighth Amendment claims would be sub-
stantively weak and preferred to dismiss the claim via a less labor-intensive 
route.55  Whatever the underlying reason for these abbreviated discussions, the 
result is that little judicial analysis considers whether particular state disenfran-
chisement laws were meant to punish.56 
This confusion about the purpose of disenfranchisement laws has trickled 
down to the general population.  As part of the May Survey, we asked respond-
ents the following question: “Some states have laws that prevent individuals 
convicted of felonies from voting.  Which of the following do you think better 
describes the purpose of these laws?”  The available answers were “To punish 
individuals for committing crimes” and “To ensure that only individuals with 
appropriate moral and cognitive abilities decide the outcome of elections.”  Of 
the 1,970 respondents, 49% selected the former and 51% the latter, indicating 
that, on the whole, Americans are unsure of the goals of disenfranchisement.  
Those who paid the most attention to politics were more convinced of the penal 
purpose of disenfranchisement (Figure 2) but only marginally more so. 
 
  
 49. Id. at 450 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 97 (1958)). 
 50. 327 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Ga. 1971). 
 51. Id. at 74.  
 52.  El-Amin v. McDonnell, No. 3:12–cv–00538–JAG, 2013 WL 1193357 (E.D. 
Va. 2013). 
 53.  King v. Boston, No. Civ. A.04–10156–RWZ, 2004 WL 1070573 (D. Mass 
2004). 
 54. El-Amin, 2013 WL 1193357, at *6 (citing Green, 380 F.2d at 450); King, 2004 
WL 1070573, at *1; see also Fernandez, 673 P.2d at 212–13. 
 55. El-Amin, 2013 WL 1193357 at *1; King, 2004 WL 1070573 at *1. 
 56. But see Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 42–45 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that 
a newly imposed law barring incarcerated felons from voting was not punitive for the 
purposes of the Ex Post Facto clause of the Constitution); King, 2004 WL 1070573 at 
*3–4 (briefly considering whether a Massachusetts law prohibiting voting by incarcer-
ated felons was penal for the purpose of Bill of Attainder analysis).  It is also worth 
mentioning, however, that courts have extensively considered potentially discrimina-
tory purpose of felon disenfranchisement laws in the context of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.  See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 224 (1985). 
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Despite this lack of clarity among jurists and the public regarding the pur-
pose of disenfranchisement laws, the history of these provisions in some states 
provides clear evidence of their punitive nature.  Consider Kentucky, which 
imposes lifetime disenfranchisement on all felons.  Kentucky originally en-
acted Section 145 – a state constitutional provision denying felons the vote – 
as part of its 1891 constitution.57  Section 145’s adoption came after a lengthy 
debate during Kentucky’s 1890 constitutional convention.  Delegates were split 
as to whether all crimes should result in disenfranchisement or merely those 
that traditionally go under the heading of crimen falsi.58  Throughout the dis-
cussion, speakers on both sides of the divide repeatedly affirmed that disen-
franchisement was a form of punishment.  Considering whether disenfranchis-
ing those who committed manslaughter would serve as an obstacle to convic-
tions, Delegate Bullitt worried: 
If you augment the punishment to that extent, do you not decrease the 
chances of conviction?  Say that a man was endeavoring to cowhide me, 
and I should shoot him; you give me the punishment, and say that that 
  
 57. KY. CONST. § 145.1 
 58. KY., OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES IN THE 
CONVENTION ASSEMBLED AT FRANKFORT, ON THE EIGHTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 1890, 
TO ADOPT, AMEND, OR CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY 1733, 
1866–67 (E.P. JOHNSON ed., 1891), https://babel.ha-
thitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=njp.32101065310581;view=1up;seq=572 [perma.cc/C7SA-
PZVE] [hereinafter KY. OFFICIAL REPORT].  “Crimen falsi” refers to “crime[s] of false-
hood or deceit” and includes offenses like perjury, fraud, and embezzlement.  Stuart 
Green, Deceit and the Classification of Crimes: Federal Rule of Evidence 609(A)(2) 































































Question: How Often Do You Follow What's Going On in Government and Public 
Affairs?
Figure 2: Purpose of Disenfranchisement By Political 
Interest
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I should be disenfranchised, if I should be found guilty; do you not de-
crease the chances of convicting me?59 
Similarly, arguing that only crimes against society (rather than those against 
individuals) should result in disenfranchisement, Delegate Brontson declared, 
[A] person should not be disqualified in the exercise of the right of suf-
frage, solely because some great wrong that he has done to an individual 
. . . but if a crime be of such character as to affect society itself . . . we 
might say, that a particular punishment for that crime shall be a disqual-
ification to exercise the right as a member of society.60 
Opposing Bronston and advocating for blanket disenfranchisement of felons, 
Delegate Sachs nevertheless indicated that he thought of disenfranchisement 
as punishment: “They say we could not obtain enforcement of the law if you 
had this additional penalty [disenfranchisement].  That is another fallacy.  The 
same argument might be applied to punishment for every crime in the cate-
gory.” 
Later in the deliberation, the convention again expressed its conviction 
that disenfranchisement was punishment.  Some members of the convention 
wished to extend disenfranchisement and to implement a prohibition on hold-
ing office to all those already convicted of a felony as of 1890;61 the existing 
state constitution only imposed these disabilities on those convicted of crimen 
falsi.62  Delegate Carroll objected to this proposition, arguing that it constituted 
an unconstitutional ex post facto law.63  One proponent of the measure, Dele-
gate Straus, responded “The gentleman is mistaken about that being an ex post 
facto law.  We do not impose any penalty upon anybody.”64  Carroll’s position 
carried the day, however, and the convention defeated the retroactive meas-
ure.65  Notably, the ex post facto argument was the only one publicly offered 
against the provision, providing a strong indication that the convention viewed 
disenfranchisement as a penalty.66 
In other states with stringent disenfranchisement laws, the punitive nature 
of the provision is explicit.  For example, in Virginia, the state constitutional 
  
 59. KY. OFFICIAL REPORT, supra note 58, at 1866–67. 
 60. Id. at 1866. 
 61. Id. at 2073. 
 62. KY. CONST. OF 1850, art. VIII § 4 (1850). 
 63. KY. OFFICIAL REPORT, supra note 58, at 2073.  Asked, “[y]our position is, then, 
that it [disqualification from holding office and the franchise] is a penalty?” Carroll 
replied “Undoubtedly.”  Id. at 2074.  The convention adopted Carroll’s stance moments 
later. Id. 
 64. Id. at 2073. 
 65. Id. at 2074. 
 66. Id. at 2073–74. 
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provision permanently disenfranchising felons can only be punitive;67 after all, 
the 1870 federal legislation readmitting Virginia to representation in Congress 
prohibits it from disenfranchising voters for reasons other than punishment for 
felonies.68  Disenfranchisement provisions in the state constitutions of other 
former members of the Confederacy have the same purpose because those 
states were readmitted to Congress on the same terms as Virginia.69  
The foregoing considerations suggest that disenfranchisement is punitive 
under at least some state regimes.  The question still remains, however, as to 
whether it is an “excessive sanction” within the meaning of the Eighth Amend-
ment. 
 
B.  The Substantive Question: Is Lifetime Disenfranchisement  
“Excessive”? 
 
The contemporary Supreme Court has generally divided Eighth Amend-
ment claims into two types: (1) “categorical” challenges and (2) “gross dispro-
portionality” challenges.70  The former asks the Court to impose a categorical 
rule against a sentencing practice while the latter claims that a particular sen-
tence is “excessive” in the context of a specific crime.71  Previous commenta-
tors have sought to fit attacks on felon disenfranchisement into both frame-
works;72 however, as we will discuss below, only the second route seems prom-
ising. 
  
 67. VA. CONST. art. II, § 1.  The two most recent Governors of Virginia have ab-
rogated the effect of this provision by individually restoring the voting rights of all 
felons who have completed probation and parole.  Vann Newkirk, How Letting Felons 
Vote Is Changing Virginia, THE ATLANTIC (Jan 8, 2018), https://www.theatlan-
tic.com/politics/archive/2018/01/virginia-clemency-restoration-of-rights-cam-
paigns/549830/ [perma.cc/2KK8-HE2F]. 
 68. Act to Admit Virginia to Representation in the Congress of the United States, 
ch. 10, 16 Stat. 62, 41st Cong. (2d Sess. 1870).  
 69. See Act Relating to Georgia, ch. 299, 16 Stat. 363, 41st Cong. (2d Sess. 1870); 
Act to Admit Texas to Representation in the Congress of the United States, ch. 39, 16 
Stat. 80, 41st Cong. (2d Sess. 1870); Act to Admit Mississippi to Representation in the 
Congress of the United States, ch. 19, 16 Stat. 67, 41st Cong. (2d Sess. 1870); Act to 
Admit North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida to 
Representation in the Congress of the United States, ch. 70, 15 Stat. 73, 40th Cong. (2d 
Sess. 1868); Act to Admit Arkansas to Representation in the Congress of the United 
States, ch. 70, 15 Stat. 72, 40th Cong. (2d Sess. 1868).  
 70. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59–60 (2010). 
 71. Id. 
 72. See, e.g., John Ghaelian, Restoring the Vote: Former Felons, International 
Law, and the Eighth Amendment, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 757, 801 (2013); Grady, 
supra note 40, at 452–58; Mark E. Thompson, Don’t Do the Crime if You Ever Intend 
to Vote Again: Challenging the Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons as Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 167, 204 (2002). 
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i.  The Categorical Challenge 
Categorical challenges under the Eighth Amendment are probably more 
familiar to most Americans than gross disproportionality claims.  According to 
the taxonomy established by Justice Kennedy in Graham v. Florida, categori-
cal challenges tend to come in two varieties: the first concerns “the nature of 
the offense,” while the second concerns “characteristics of the offenders.”73  
Kennedy v. Louisiana74 and its predecessors exemplify “nature of the offense”-
type rules; they prohibit capital punishment for certain non-homicide of-
fenses.75  Meanwhile, classic “characteristics of the offender” cases include 
Atkins v. Virginia,76 Roper v. Simmons,77 and Ford v. Wainwright78 – those 
rulings categorically barred execution of those with serious intellectual disabil-
ities, those who were under eighteen when the crime was committed, and the 
insane.  Categorical challenges might also seek to impose rules against partic-
ular types of punishment.  For instance, the Supreme Court has indicated that 
the U.S. government generally cannot impose torture or denaturalization as 
punishment for crimes.79 
The claim that states can never authorize disenfranchisement as punish-
ment would fall squarely in the realm of a categorical challenge.  A few com-
mentators have gone down this path, arguing that the Eighth Amendment cat-
egorically prohibits at least ex-felon disenfranchisement.80  However, these 
claims are, frankly, untenable.  In cases where it is asked to impose a categor-
ical Eighth Amendment rule, the Supreme Court generally demands at least 
some evidence of a “national consensus” against the challenged practice.81  
Here, our surveys make clear that no such consensus exists.    
The “objective indicia” the Court typically looks to in the case of categor-
ical challenges further suggest that such a tactic would be futile.82  While only 
two states permanently disenfranchise all felons, forty-eight prevent them from 
voting at least while incarcerated and nine continue to impose lifetime voting 
  
 73. Graham, 560 U.S. at 60. 
 74. 554 U.S. 407 (2008). 
 75. Id. at 446–47 (prohibiting capital punishment for the non-homicide rape of a 
child); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1981) (overturning a capital sentence for 
felony murder when the defendant did not kill anyone, attempt to kill anyone, or intend 
for lethal force to be used); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (eliminating 
the death penalty for the non-homicide rape of an adult woman). 
 76. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (exempting individuals with severe intellectual dis-
abilities from execution). 
 77. 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (ruling that capital punishment for minors violates 
the Eighth Amendment). 
 78. 477 U.S. 399, 401 (1986) (forbidding the execution of the insane). 
 79. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 48–49 (2008). 
 80. See Ghaelian, supra note 72, at 801; Thompson, supra note 72, at 204. 
 81. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010). 
 82. Id. at 62. 
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bans on those convicted of certain violent crimes.83  While undoubtedly 
“[t]here are measures of consensus other than legislation,”84 the May Survey 
further suggests that an Eighth Amendment assault on felon disenfranchise-
ment “as it applies to an entire class of offenders who have committed a range 
of crimes” would be unavailing.85   
ii.  The Gross Disproportionality Challenge 
In contrast to a categorical challenge, a gross disproportionality claim 
could potentially prevail under the right circumstances.  In considering whether 
a particular sentence is grossly disproportionate to a crime, the Supreme Court 
employs a two-step test.86  First, it compares the gravity of the offense and the 
severity of the sentence.87  If this initial comparison leads the Justices to believe 
that the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime, they proceed to com-
pare it to “the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction” 
and “the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other juris-
dictions.”88 
The disenfranchisement laws in Kentucky and Iowa – which permanently 
bar all felons from voting89 – seem particularly vulnerable to challenge by a 
first-time offender convicted of a relatively minor, non-violent felony.  Exam-
ples of minor, non-violent felonies in Kentucky include cultivation of mariju-
ana,90 possession of coca leaves,91 lying to obtain a medical prescription,92 and 
passing a “no-account” check for $500.93  As we discuss below, revoking the 
franchise for life could potentially be grossly disproportionate to the serious-
ness of these offenses under the Supreme Court’s test.  
  
 83. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., supra note 1. 
 84. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 433 (2008). 
 85. Graham, 560 U.S. at 61–62. 
 86. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 22 (2003) (plurality opinion); Harmelin v. 
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1004–05 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in judg-
ment). 
 87. See, e.g., Ewing, 538 U.S. at 22; Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005. 
 88. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 22 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 279 (1983)).  
When Justice Powell first applied this form of analysis it was considered a three-factor 
test rather than a two-step process. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290–92 (1983).  How-
ever, Justice Kennedy’s controlling opinion in Harmelin altered the procedure such that 
the Court only reaches the second step if it makes the initial inference of gross dispro-
portionality.  Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1004–05 (Kennedy, J. concurring in part and in 
judgment); United States v. Rivera-Ruperto, 852 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2017). 
 89. KY. CONST. § 145.1; Griffin v. Pate, 884 N.W.2d 182, 205 (Iowa 2016). 
 90. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 218A.1423(2) (West 2018). 
 91. § 218A.1415(1). 
 92. § 218A.140(1). 
 93. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 514.040(1)(e); 514.040(8)(a) (West 2018). 
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a.  Step One: Comparing the Gravity of the Offense and the Severity of the 
Sentence 
In cases applying the aforementioned two-step approach, the Supreme 
Court ostensibly takes into account “all the circumstances in a particular 
case.”94  However, in practice it has consistently focused on the following fac-
tors: (1) the offender’s actual behavior;95 (2) the offender’s criminal history;96 
(3) the state’s penological purpose in imposing the punishment;97 and (4) the 
length and severity of the punishment imposed.98  In the hypothetical case of a 
first-time, non-violent offender in Kentucky, considerations (1) and (2) would 
point towards a finding of disproportionality.  The Supreme Court has been 
unequivocal that “nonviolent crimes are less serious than crimes marked by 
violence or the threat of violence.”99  It has described passing a bad check – a 
Class D felony in Kentucky100 – as “one of the most passive felonies a person 
could commit.”101  Should such a crime be a person’s only felony conviction, 
the Court’s precedents dictate that the punishment would have to be limited. 
The Supreme Court’s most recent discussion of the relationship between 
the Eighth Amendment and penological purpose (outside the categorical con-
text)102 was Ewing v. California, a challenge to California’s three-strikes 
law.103  In the controlling opinion for the Court, Justice O’Connor devoted no-
table attention to the state’s deterrence and incapacitation interests in imposing 
a mandatory sentence of twenty-five years to life on certain recidivists.104  The 
decision was careful to emphasize the relationship between these justifications 
and the sentence imposed:  
  
 94. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010). 
 95. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003) (plurality opinion); Harmelin v. 
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001–04 (1991) (Kennedy, J. concurring in part and in judg-
ment); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 296 (1983); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 
265–66, 269, 276, 280–81 (1980). 
 96. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 29–30; Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1002 (Kennedy, J. concur-
ring in part and in judgment); Solem, 463 U.S. at 287, 292–93; Rummel, 445 U.S. at 
276, 278. 
 97. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25–28; Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998–99 (Kennedy, J. con-
curring in part and in judgment); Solem, U.S. 277 at 296–97; Rummel, 445 U.S. at 276. 
 98. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 24, 30; Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J. concurring 
in part and in judgment); Solem, 463 U.S. at 297; Rummel, 445 U.S. at 278, 280–81. 
 99. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292–93. 
 100. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 514.040(1)(e); 514.040(8)(a) (West 2018). 
 101. Solem, 463 U.S. at 296 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 102. The Court has, of course, discussed penological purpose in Eighth Amendment 
cases involving categorical rules.  See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472–474 
(2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71–75 (2010). 
 103. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25–28. 
 104. Id. at 26–27. 
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When the California Legislature enacted the three strikes law, it made 
a judgment that protecting the public safety requires incapacitating 
criminals who have already been convicted of at least one serious or 
violent crime . . . [t]o be sure, Ewing's sentence is a long one. But it 
reflects a rational legislative judgment, entitled to deference, that of-
fenders who have committed serious or violent felonies and who con-
tinue to commit felonies must be incapacitated.105 
In the same breath, however, Justice O’Connor seemed to acknowledge 
the necessity of some connection between crime and punishment if a state law 
is to survive Eighth Amendment scrutiny.106   The state must have a “reasona-
ble basis for believing that [the specified punishment] ‘advance[s] the goals of 
[its] criminal justice system in any substantial way.’”107  The use of the word 
“substantial” here is significant given its common use across different areas of 
constitutional law.  In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey,108 the Court (and Justice O’Connor in particular) deliberately used “sub-
stantial” to describe the sort of obstacle to abortion access that would violate 
the Fourteenth Amendment.109  Similarly, in the process of creating intermedi-
ate scrutiny in Craig v. Boren,110 the Court used “substantial” to characterize 
the required relationship between gender-based classification and the state’s 
interest.111  Across these areas of constitutional law and others,112 “substantial” 
stands in contrast to more minimalist words like “rational.”113  Accordingly, 
Justice O’Connor’s decision to describe as “substantial” the amount that a 
seemingly harsh punishment must advance the state’s penological goal sug-
gests that the state needs more than a nominal interest in enforcing the chal-
lenged sentence. 
  
 105. Id. at 25, 30. 
 106. Id. at 25.  
 107. Id. at 28 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 297 n.22 (1983)) (emphasis 
added) (plurality opinion).  The Court’s initial use this language in Solem referred only 
to the degree to which a particular sentence must advance the state’s interest, not to the 
amount of deference a state receives in impose certain punishments.  Solem, 463 U.S. 
at 297 n.22.   
 108. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 109. Id. at 877. 
 110. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 111. Id. at 197. 
 112. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (“Our case law firmly es-
tablishes Congress' power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic 
class of activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”) (emphasis 
added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 113. See, e.g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 363 (1970) (no “rational” state in-
terest in a requirement that members of board of education be freeholders). 
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Of course, as commentators have repeatedly pointed out,114 it is hard to 
identify any interest the state has in lifetime disenfranchisement of first-time 
offenders.  Courts have traditionally identified four rationales for punishment: 
incapacitation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.115  Among these, re-
habilitation can be dismissed out-of-hand.  Permanently barring an ex-felon 
from voting does nothing to make her a “better person” – indeed, it reinforces 
her sense that she is unwelcome in civil society.  Consequently, the prevailing 
scholarly consensus, acknowledged by at least one court,116 is that disenfran-
chisement is associated with an increase in recidivism.117  The deterrence ar-
gument is similarly fanciful.  The federal courts to consider the issue have uni-
formly concluded that disenfranchisement laws serve no deterrent purpose.118  
Moreover, the group of adults most likely to be convicted of crimes in this 
country – young men119 – is precisely the group least likely to exercise the 
franchise.120  Politicians would be hard-pressed to imagine a less effective 
means of deterring potential offenders. 
Incapacitation, meanwhile, was the actual justification propounded by 
politicians in Kentucky for disenfranchisement.  Advocates for permanent dis-
enfranchisement of all felons at the 1890 convention repeatedly referred to this 
  
 114. See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 7, at 1166–67; Alec Ewald, “Civil Death”: The 
Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 
WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1105–08 (2002). 
 115. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472–74 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 
560 U.S. 48, 71–75 (2010); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25–28 (2003). 
 116. See Griffin v. Pate, 884 N.W.2d 182, 202–03 (Iowa 2016); see also id. at 209–
10 (Hecht, J., dissenting). 
 117. See Guy Padraic Hamilton-Smith & Matt Vogel, The Violence of Voiceless-
ness: The Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement on Recidivism, 22 BERKELEY LA RAZA 
L.J. 407, 414–16 (2012); Regina Austin, The Shame of It All: Stigma and the Political 
Disenfranchisement of Formerly Convicted and Incarcerated Persons, 36 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 173, 182–84 (2004); Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Voting and 
Subsequent Crime and Arrest: Evidence from a Community Sample, 36 COLUM. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 193, 214–15 (2004); Afi S. Johnson-Parris, Felon Disenfranchisement: 
The Unconscionable Social Contract Breached, 89 VA. L. REV. 109, 123 (2003); 
ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY 
IN THE UNITED STATES 307 (2000). 
 118. Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 45 (1st Cir. 2009) (evaluating disenfran-
chisement under the Mendoza-Martinez factors and making no mention of any deter-
rence value); King v. Boston, No. Civ.A.04–10156–RWZ, 2004 WL 1070573, at *1 
(D. Mass. May 13, 2004) (disenfranchisement “certainly does not further the traditional 
aims of punishment; namely, deterrence and rehabilitation.”). 
 119. E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., AGING OF THE 
STATE PRISON POPULATION, 1993–2013 10 (2016). 
 120. Hannah Hartig, In Year of Record Midterm Turnout, Women Continued to Vote 
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punishment as necessary to safeguard the “purity of the ballot.”121  The pre-
vailing notion seems to have been that allowing tainted individuals like felons 
to vote would somehow injure the body-politic by corrupting the collective 
judgement rendered.122  Disenfranchisement was thus the only means of pro-
tecting virtuous citizens.  Common though that idea may have once been, it has 
since been roundly rejected by contemporary jurists.  Starting as early as Car-
rington v. Rash,123 the Supreme Court has maintained that “‘[t]he exercise of 
rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions,’ cannot constitu-
tionally be obliterated because of a fear of the political views of a particular 
group of bona fide residents”124 and that “‘[f]encing out’ from the franchise a 
sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally 
impermissible.”125  Put plainly, states cannot keep felons from the ballot be-
cause of the political choices they might make.   
Finally, the state’s retributive interest in punishment is directly tied to the 
moral culpability of the crime and the satisfaction the public receives from see-
ing the offender suffer.126  It is “an attempt to express the community’s moral 
outrage or [] an attempt to right the balance for the wrong to the victim.”127  
When the public does not perceive the defendant’s punishment as deserved, the 
state’s retributive justification for imposing it evaporates.128  In the hypothet-
ical case at hand, our polling makes abundantly clear that society does not be-
lieve low-level offenders deserve permanent disenfranchisement.  As men-
tioned above, less than one-fifth of Americans believe that felons should be 
permanently disenfranchised, and nearly 60% believe that a lifetime voting ban 
is “too harsh” a consequence for drug possession.  The figures are more ex-
treme among those who consider disenfranchisement to be punishment; less 
than 15% favor permanent disenfranchisement, and 70% believe that it is an 
  
 121. KY. OFFICIAL REPORT, supra note 58, at 1864. 
 122. Id.  
 123. 380 U.S. 89 (1965). 
 124. Id. at 94. 
 125. Id.; see also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 355 (1972); Cipriano v. City of 
Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969). 
 126. See, e.g., Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 709 (2014) (“[t]he diminished capacity 
of the intellectually disabled lessens moral culpability and hence the retributive value 
of the punishment.”); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 442 (2008) (“goal of retri-
bution . . . reflects society’s and the victim’s interests in seeing that the offender is 
repaid for the hurt he caused”); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) (“[t]he heart 
of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the 
personal culpability of the criminal offender.”). 
 127. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005). 
 128. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion) (explaining 
that the state’s retributive interest stems from the necessity of “channeling” the venge-
ful instincts of citizens in the face of “particularly offensive conduct”); cf. Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment) (justifying 
retribution as an aim of punishment by describing the societal instability that might 
result without it). 
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excessive punishment for drug possession.  Limiting the sample to just those 
from Iowa and Kentucky – the two states that impose lifetime voting bans for 
all felonies – does not significantly alter the results.  A mere 24% of residents 
in those states favor permanent disenfranchisement (which accords with num-
bers from state-specific polls),129 and 65% believe it is “too harsh” when im-
posed for drug possession.  Collectively, these figures make clear that there is 
no retributive case for permanent disenfranchisement of small-time offenders. 
Thus far in our comparison of the gravity of the crime to the severity of 
the sentence, we have focused on the first half of the equation with particular 
emphasis on the offender’s actual behavior, her criminal history, and the state’s 
penological purpose in imposing the punishment.  However, it is important to 
keep in mind the harshness of a lifetime ban on voting.  Suffrage is a funda-
mental right guaranteed by the Constitution.130  It is all the more zealously 
guarded because it is “preservative of all other basic civil liberties and political 
rights.”131  Justices have variously described voting as an “extraordinary 
right,”132 “of the most fundamental significance,”133 and as “the essence of a 
democratic society.”134  These paeans to the franchise imply that restrictions 
on voting impose a greater constitutional burden than other restrictions associ-
ated with felony convictions.135   
Social science research affirms the toll that voting bans take on ex-offend-
ers.  Disenfranchisement contributes to the stigmatization of these individuals 
by reducing their ability to participate in civic affairs.136  In some areas, indi-
viduals who do not vote are subject to scorn.137  Indeed, political scientists have 
convincingly demonstrated that social pressure has an outsized impact on voter 
turnout,138 and shaming non-voters has become an explicit campaign tactic on 
  
 129. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 130. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. at 210 (Souter, J., 
dissenting); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 83 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). 
 131. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). 
 132. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 234 (1982) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 133. Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 
(1979). 
 134. Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 764 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 135. These disabilities often include ineligibility for public housing and other ben-
efits, disbarment from various professional occupations, and prohibitions on firearm 
ownership, among others.  See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 57, 
144–54, 189–90 (2010) (discussing the civil disabilities that apply to felons in the 
United States); Austin, supra note 117, at 176. 
 136. See, e.g., Austin, supra note 117, at 176–77. 
 137. See Alan S. Gerber et al., Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from 
a Large-Scale Field Experiment, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 33, 38–39 (2008) (demon-
strating that the threat of revealing an individual’s failure to vote to neighbors increases 
turnout); Austin, supra note 117, at 177. 
 138. Gerber et al., supra note 137, at 39. 
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the part of some politicians.139  Lifetime bans on voting ensure that ex-felons 
in Kentucky and Iowa are perpetually subject to this civil death. 
That the governors of these states are empowered to restore the voting 
rights of disenfranchised individuals does not diminish the severity of this pun-
ishment.140  As discussed in Solem, the possibility of executive clemency does 
not redeem an otherwise unconstitutional sentence.141  Moreover, relatively 
few disenfranchised individuals in Kentucky and Iowa ever have their rights 
restored by the states’ chief executives.  In Kentucky, about 312,000 adults 
were barred from voting as of 2016.142  Incumbent Governor Matt Bevin has 
restored the voting rights of 981 of those individuals during his three years in 
office.143  Another 1,663 have had minor felony convictions expunged via a 
2016 law;144 however, the process takes several months, costs $540, and only 
  
 139. David Weigel, Cruz Campaign Accuses Rubio of Hypocrisy on ‘Social Pres-




 140. KY. CONST. § 145(1); IOWA CONST. art. IV, §16. 
 141. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 301–03 (1983). 
 142. THE SENT’G PROJECT, supra note 25. 
 143. Adam Beam, Report: More Than 312,000 Felons Can’t Vote Kentucky, 
WCPO.COM (Jan 29, 2019, 5:43 PM), https://www.wcpo.com/news/government/elec-
tions-local/report-more-than-312-000-felons-cant-vote-kentucky [perma.cc/VH4Z-
274T]. 
 144. Michael Wines, Why So Many Kentuckians Are Barred from Voting on Tues-
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applies to a subset of Class D offenses.145  In Iowa, the disenfranchised popu-
lation was about 52,000 in 2016;146 only seventeen people even bothered ap-
plying for a gubernatorial restoration of voting rights in 2015.147  In short, dis-
enfranchisement is effectively permanent in these states. 
The foregoing considerations strongly suggest that for a first-time of-
fender convicted of a relatively minor felony in Kentucky, lifetime disenfran-
chisement would constitute “the rare case in which a threshold comparison of 
the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross 
disproportionality.”148  The circumstances the Supreme Court often takes into 
account when making this comparison – (1) the offender’s actual behavior; (2) 
the offender’s criminal history; (3) the state’s penological purpose in imposing 
the punishment; and (4) the length and severity of the punishment imposed – 
uniformly point towards that conclusion.149  Accordingly, we now compare 
“the defendant's sentence with the sentences received by other offenders in the 
same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other 
jurisdictions” in order to confirm this initial judgment.150 
b.  Step Two: Comparative Analysis 
The first component of the Court’s comparative analysis examines the 
relationship between the sentence imposed for the crime at issue and the sen-
tences imposed for more serious offenses in the same state.151  According to 
the Court in Solem, “If more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty, or 
  
 145.  House Bill 40: Felony Expungement, KY. CT. OF JUST., 
https://courts.ky.gov/felonyexpungement/Pages/default.aspx [perma.cc/S4BM-
7HWZ] (last visited July 6, 2019).  Numerous non-violent, relatively minor offenses – 
including selling nine ounces of marijuana, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 218A.1421 (West 
2019), trafficking in cold medicine, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 218A.1414 (West 2019), 
making a false statement to obtain a credit card, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 434.570 (West 
2019), second-degree burglary, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 511.030 (West 2019), tamper-
ing with public records, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 519.060 (West 2019), first-degree bail 
jumping, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 520.070 (West 2019), fleeing the police, KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 520.095 (West 2019), making a false statement in an official proceeding, 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 523.020 (West 2019), promoting prostitution, KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 529.040 (West 2019), and incest, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 530.020 (West 2019) 
– are not eligible for expungement. 
 146. THE SENT’G PROJECT, supra note 25. 
 147. David Pitt, Iowa Simplifies Voting Rights Restoration Form for Felons, AP 
NEWS (Apr. 27, 2016) https://apnews.com/887edea415284232b6ab12e074e233d4 
[perma.cc/6NNJ-55NK]. 
 148. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 960 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
judgment). 
 149. See, e.g., id. at 998–99; Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290–91 (1983). 
 150. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 60 (2010) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 
501 U.S. 957, 1005 (1991)). 
 151. Solem, 463 U.S. at 291.  
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to less serious penalties, that is some indication that the punishment at issue 
may be excessive.”152   
In Kentucky, lifetime disenfranchisement is imposed on all felons, re-
gardless of severity.153  An individual convicted of selling nine grams of mari-
juana is disenfranchised to exactly the same extent as one convicted of murder, 
sexual assault, or armed robbery.154  As the Court has often reiterated, the fact 
that a far less morally culpable crime receives the same punishment in Ken-
tucky as heinous offenses indicates that the former sentence is excessive.155 
The second component of the comparative analysis is more involved and 
helps the Court to determine whether “evolving standards of decency” render 
a particular sentence excessive.156  At this stage in the inquiry, the Court tradi-
tionally compares the number of states that engage in a particular sentencing 
practice to the number that have rejected it.  In recent years, however, the Court 
has considered two additional factors when making its assessment.  In Graham, 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion acknowledged that “actual sentencing 
practices are an important part of the Court’s inquiry into consensus,” and took 
into account “how rare” the challenged sentence (life-without-parole for juve-
niles guilty of non-homicide crimes) was in practice.157  Accordingly, the Gra-
ham Court ruled that life-without-parole was an excessive punishment for ju-
veniles not convicted of murder, even though thirty-seven states theoretically 
allowed it.158  More controversially, the Court has recognized the relevance of 
sentencing practices in similarly situated countries, though this sort of evidence 
is generally entitled to less weight.159   
Here, all three considerations militate in favor of finding an Eighth 
Amendment violation.  The first factor does so dramatically.  Figure 3 tracks 
the number of states permitting lifetime disenfranchisement for a first drug of-
fense in the years since the Court turned away an Equal Protection challenge 
to the practice in Richardson v. Ramirez.  In 1974, the year that case was de-
cided, twenty-four states had such laws on the books; today, that number is 
two.160 
  
 152. Id. 
 153. KY. CONST. § 145(1). 
 154. Id.  Sale of marijuana is not among the crimes eligible for expungement under 
H.B. 40 in Kentucky.  Class D Felony Offenses Eligible for Expungement, KY. CT. OF 
JUST., https://kycourts.gov/felonyexpungement/Pages/eligibleoffenses.aspx 
[perma.cc/D7N8-LJRD] (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).  As such, the only way for some-
one convicted of that crime to regain their voting rights is to receive clemency from the 
governor.  KY. CONST. § 145(1). 
 155. See, e.g., Solem, 463 U.S. at 290–92. 
 156. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010). 
 157. Id. at 62–65. 
 158. Id. at 62. 
 159. See id. at 80; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–78 (2005). 
 160. To obtain the data for this claim and the subsequent graph, see Richardson v. 
Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 48 n.14 (1974); Angela Behrens et al., Ballot Manipulation and 
the “Menace of Negro Domination”: Racial Threat and Felon Disenfranchisement in 
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Even in the states (Kentucky and Iowa) that still permanently disenfran-
chise felons, the governors – both Republicans161 – have expressed opposition 
to the practice, and the legislatures have recently debated bills to soften the 
policy.162  State legislation thus exhibits a strong consensus against permanent 
disenfranchisement for non-violent, first-time offenders. 
As one might suspect, the fraction of non-violent ex-felons actually sub-
ject to lifetime disenfranchisement is similarly small.  It is difficult to arrive at 
a precise estimate of this statistic, but a conservative calculation will be suffi-
cient for our purposes here.  A 2017 study by University of Georgia Sociology 
Professor Sarah Shannon and others estimated that the former felon population 
– that is, individuals once convicted of a felony but no longer in prison, on 
  
the United States, 1850–2002, 109 AM. J. OF SOC. 559, 565 (2003); Christopher Uggen 
& Jeff Manze, Summary of Changes to State Felon Disfranchisement Law 1865-2003, 
THE SENT’G PROJECT 1–2 (Apr. 1, 2003), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2016/01/Summary-of-Changes-to-State-Felon-Disfranchisement-Law-
1865-2003.pdf [perma.cc/62NW-Z76B]; Note, The Need for Reform of Ex-Felon Dis-
enfranchisement Laws, 83 YALE L.J. 580, 583 n.18 (1974). 
 161. Governors Roster 2019, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N 1 (2019), 
https://www.nga.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Governors-Roster.pdf 
[perma.cc/W66C-KBNR]. 
 162. Stephen Gruber-Miller, Iowa House Overwhelmingly Passes Felon Voting 
Rights Constitutional Amendment, DES MOINES REG. (Mar. 28, 2019, 12:51 PM), 
https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/politics/2019/03/28/iowa-felon-vot-
ing-rights-constitutional-amendment-house-votes-governor-kim-reynolds-pro-
posal/3298419002/ [perma.cc/67Q5-QMFQ]; Chris Kenning, Most Kentucky Felons 
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probation, or on parole – was about 14,474,204 in 2010.163  Meanwhile, the 
U.S. Department of Justice reported in 2004 that about 32.6% of individuals 
exiting state prisons were incarcerated for drug offenses.164  Given that a large 
number of individuals convicted of drug-related felonies never go to prison, 
32.6% is likely an underestimate of the fraction of the ex-felon population com-
posed of drug criminals.  Nevertheless, combining these two statistics indicates 
that there are at least 4,718,500 individuals convicted of drug-related felonies 
living in the United States today outside the control of the prison system.165  
Only in Arizona, Nevada, Wyoming, Kentucky, and Iowa can an individual be 
permanently disenfranchised for a drug-crime, and only Kentucky and Iowa 
impose that punishment on first-time offenders.166  In 2016, the Sentencing 
Project estimated the number of disenfranchised ex-felons by state – in those 
five, the total was 463,174.167  As such, if every ex-felon in those states was 
permanently disenfranchised – and all for drug crimes – the probability of life-
time disenfranchisement conditional on a felony drug conviction would be 
about 9.8%.168  Of course, most individuals in those five states were not disen-
franchised for drug crimes.169  Accordingly, a conservative estimate of the ac-
tual likelihood of receiving a lifetime voting ban – conditional on conviction 
for a drug crime – would be less than 5%, and lower still for individuals with 
only a single offense on their record. 
These statistics confirm that the overwhelming consensus among the 
states – as expressed both in legislation and practice – is against lifetime dis-
enfranchisement for first-time, non-violent offenders.  If anything, the interna-
tional consensus points even more strongly in that direction.  It appears that the 
only other democracy to impose lifetime disenfranchisement under any cir-
cumstances is Belgium.170  Yet even there, lifetime disenfranchisement only 
  
 163. Sarah Shannon et al., The Growth, Scope, and Spatial Distribution of People 
with Felony Records in the United States, 1948–2010, 54 DEMOGRAPHY 1795, 1805, 
1808 (2017). 
 164. Matthew Durose & Christopher Mumola, Profile of Nonviolent Offenders Ex-
iting State Prisons, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 1, 2 (Oct. 2004), https://www.bjs.gov/con-
tent/pub/pdf/pnoesp.pdf [perma.cc/2DW4-H28V]. 
 165. See Shannon et al., supra note 163; see also Durose & Mumola, supra note 
164. 
 166. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., supra note 1. 
 167. THE SENT’G PROJECT, supra note 25.  
 168. See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., supra note 1; see also SENT’G PROJECT, supra 
note 25. 
 169. See Durose & Mumola, supra note 164, at 2. 
 170. Pamela A. Wilkins, The Mark of Cain: Disenfranchised Felons and the Con-
stitutional No Man’s Land, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 85, 90 (2005); BRANDON 
ROTTINGHAUS, INCARCERATION AND ENFRANCHISEMENT: INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES, 
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accompanies prison sentences of more than seven years.171  Kentucky and 
Iowa’s practice of disenfranchising all felons for life thus has no international 
counterpart. 
Every aspect of the comparative analysis we have examined affirms the 
conclusion from previous section: for first-time offenders convicted of rela-
tively minor felonies (such as drug crimes), lifetime disenfranchisement is a 
grossly disproportionate punishment.  Individuals fitting that description in a 
state like Kentucky would accordingly have a strong Eighth Amendment claim 
to make. 
It is important to acknowledge, however, that this sort of legal argument 
would only be available to a subset of the permanently disenfranchised.  A 
lifetime voting ban is an undeniably severe sanction.  Nevertheless, the fore-
going analysis makes clear that, when applying the proportionality principle, 
the Supreme Court is as concerned with the culpability of the offender as it is 
with the harshness of the punishment.172  Outside the capital context, it typi-
cally takes an uncommonly sympathetic defendant to win relief under the 
Eighth Amendment.173  For those convicted of non-violent offenses the Justices 
still see as highly blameworthy – for example, those convicted of distributing 
large amounts of cocaine174 – the Eighth Amendment holds little promise.   
It would be a mistake, though, to think that the excessive punishment ar-
gument is only useful in the context of legal action.  As the next section dis-
cusses, the frame could be potent in the context of legislative debates and po-
tentially benefit a much larger swath of the disenfranchised. 
C.  Excessive Punishment and Legislation  
The restrictive nature of their disenfranchisement laws has not escaped 
the notice of politicians in Kentucky and Iowa.  In the aftermath of Florida’s 
2018 referendum on the subject, lawmakers in both states immediately intro-
duced amendments to the state constitution that would parallel the change made 
  
 171. Ali Rickart, Disenfranchisement: A Comparative Look at the Right of the Pris-
oner to Vote, IUS GENTIUM (Feb. 15, 2015), https://ubaltciclfellows.word-
press.com/2015/02/06/disenfranchisement-a-comparative-look-at-the-right-of-the-
prisoner-to-vote/ [perma.cc/R8Z7-5KM4]. 
 172. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67 (2010). 
 173. See, e.g., id. at 52–58 (overturning a life sentence without parole for a minor 
with an armed robbery conviction); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 280–81 (1983) (in-
validating a life sentence without parole for a man with multiple minor offenses but had 
never committed a crime while sober); but cf. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 
412–15 (2008) (prohibiting the death penalty for the rape of a child). 
 174. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1002 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part and in judgment) (“Petitioner was convicted of possession of more than 650 grams 
(over 1.5 pounds) of cocaine . . . [p]etitioner’s suggestion that his crime was nonviolent 
and victimless, echoed by the dissent, is false to the point of absurdity. To the contrary, 
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in Florida.175  In Iowa, the state House of Representatives actually passed a 
measure to restore voting rights to individuals who had completed their entire 
sentences in March of 2019;176 however, the state Senate killed the proposal 
days later.177  Around the same time, a member of the Kentucky Senate intro-
duced a similar constitutional amendment,178 and the current governor ostensi-
bly supported changing the state’s law.179  Nevertheless, reform in either state 
remains several legislative votes and a statewide referendum away.180  
In light of the stalled momentum towards change in these states, it is 
worth studying the advantages of using the excessive punishment argument 
instead of other rhetorical tactics.  First, and perhaps most importantly, indi-
viduals who see disenfranchisement as punishment are generally much more 
likely to oppose the practice.  This trend holds across both party and ideology 
(Figure 4).  Accordingly, highlighting the extremely punitive nature of lifetime 




 175. Gruber-Miller, supra note 162; Kenning, supra note 162. 
 176. Gruber-Miller, supra at 162. 
 177. Stephen Gruber-Miller & Barabara Rodriguez, Felon Voting Rights Constitu-




 178. Kenning, supra note 162. 
 179. David Weigel, Kentucky’s New Governor Reverses Executive Order That Re-




 180. See IOWA CONST. art. 10, § 1 (describing the process for amending the Iowa 
state constitution); KY. CONST. § 256. 
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Second, focusing on disenfranchisement as excessive punishment would 
help maintain the bipartisan opposition to Iowa and Kentucky’s existing prac-
tices.181  As Part II.B.ii illustrates, characterizing a punishment as “excessive” 
draws attention to individualized assessments of desert, rather than society-
level analyses of the impact of eliminating that punishment.  In states where 
supermajorities already support changing disenfranchisement laws, this indi-
vidualized focus is precisely what advocates for reform should want.  Empha-
sizing the disparate impact of disenfranchisement risks arousing unnecessary 
Republican opposition by highlighting the widely held notion that diminishing 
the scope of the practice would benefit Democrats (see Table 1 and Table 2). 
Just as in the Eighth Amendment context, though, the utility of the exces-
sive punishment argument in the legislative arena is limited to specific situa-
tions.  So long as the focus remains on the most draconian restrictions and the 
least culpable offenders, it has substantial persuasive authority.  However, 
when the subject becomes voting rights for those in prison and those convicted 
of serious crimes, its efficacy fades.  Even survey respondents who identified 
as Democrats – the partisan group most supportive of restoring voting rights – 
slightly favored disenfranchising the incarcerated (44% to 43%, with 13% un-
sure) and thought lifetime disenfranchisement was “appropriate” for those con-
victed of sexual assault (57%).  To chip away at these more popular policies, 
activists need to adopt a different framework, one that highlights the broader 
negative consequences of disenfranchisement. 
PART III: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND THE VRA  
A second argument against felon disenfranchisement focuses on its dis-
criminatory impact.  It is an undeniable fact that these laws have a differential 
negative effect on the political voice of minority communities – as Figure 5 
indicates, rates of disenfranchisement among African Americans exceed rates 
of disenfranchisement among the general population in every state outside of 
Maine and Vermont (which do not practice disenfranchisement).  This situation 
obviously raises immediate concerns and highlights the potential for even 
greater problems in this regard in the future.   
  
 181. See Weigel, supra note 179; Gruber-Miller, supra note 162; LEAGUE OF 
WOMEN VOTERS OF KENTUCKY, supra note 36, at 7; Gruber-Miller & Rodriguez, supra 
note 177. 
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The number of individuals who have lost their right to vote due to felony 
convictions is large and has grown substantially over time – by one estimate 
from 1.17 million in 1976 to 6.1 million in 2016.182  The vast majority of them 
(77%) are individuals who are no longer incarcerated and have either com-
pleted their sentence or are in the parole or probation stage of transition.183  Six 
states – Alabama, Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Virginia – 
have felon disenfranchisement rates exceeding 7% of age-eligible voters, 
which is more than double the national average.184  Notably, three of these 
states – Alabama, Mississippi, and Virginia – were covered by the Section 5 
preclearance formula prior to Shelby County v. Holder.185    
The disparate impact of felon disenfranchisement on African-Americans 
is stark: 7.4% of age-eligible African-Americans are denied the ballot as the 
result of a felony conviction, compared to only 1.8% of non-African-Ameri-
cans nationwide.  Prior to the passage of Amendment 4, more than one in five 
African-Americans were disenfranchised in Florida, a situation that continues 
in Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia.186  
These disturbing trends lend themselves to an argument against disenfran-
chisement that might be particularly effective in the case of less sympathetic 
felons.  In a country where a plurality still supports capital punishment, the 
claim that denying violent criminals the franchise is an “excessive” sanction 
would likely strike some as implausible.  By instead focusing on the collective 
impact disenfranchisement has on minority communities, opponents of disen-
franchisement can take the spotlight off more culpable offenders and tie felon 
disenfranchisement to larger (and more popular) campaigns for voting rights 
access.  This strategy carries substantial risks, however.  In drawing attention 
  
 182. Christopher Uggen et al., State-Level Estimates of Felony Disenfranchisement, 
2016, THE SENT’G PROJECT 3 (2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2016/01/Summary-of-Changes-to-State-Felon-Disfranchisement-Law-
1865-2003.pdf [perma.cc/CU2Z-TBUW]. 
 183. Id. at 6. 
 184. Id. at 15. 
 185. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 537–39 (2013). 
 186. PALM BEACH POST, supra note 2. 
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to their disparate racial impact, those seeking to challenge disenfranchisement 
laws might inadvertently highlight an opportunity for those who seek to ma-
nipulate electoral rules for political advantage. 
As we discussed earlier, prevailing political conditions make felon disen-
franchisement a potentially dangerous weapon in a closely contested and in-
creasingly partisan era.  While the trend to date has been predominantly to-
wards restoring rights, it is by no means uniform.  In Kentucky and Iowa, Re-
publican governors overturned earlier executive actions that had restored felon 
voting rights.187  Likewise, the felon voting rights victory in Florida that came 
with the passage of Amendment 4 was subsequently compromised in 2019 by 
a bill that required felons to pay off all court-related debts before individuals 
could be restored to suffrage.188  In Virginia, Governor Terry McAuliffe’s ex-
ecutive action allowing felons to vote before they completed their sentence was 
initially overturned by the state supreme court at the request of the state legis-
lature.189  In short, given the larger political context – in which voting re-
strictions are seen as an acceptable political strategy – there is a serious possi-
bility of future retrogressive actions with respect to felon voting rights.   
Moreover, this possibility arises at a time when the primary tool for stop-
ping retrogression – Section 5 of the VRA – has been gutted.  Before the Court 
ruled that the old coverage formula violated the Tenth Amendment, Section 5 
entirely covered nine states and partially covered four.190  “Covered” status 
meant that those jurisdictions had to “preclear” any changes they made to their 
election rules through the Justice Department or the D.C. District Court.191  To 
receive preclearance, the jurisdiction bore the burden of showing that the new 
rule did not have the “purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the 
right to vote on account of race or color.”192  Of the nine that were wholly 
covered, two states – Alabama and Mississippi – permanently disenfranchise 
some felons, and the other five – Alaska, Georgia, Louisiana, South Carolina, 
and Virginia – all require that a person’s sentence be completed in its entirety 
(including parole and probation) before her voting rights are reinstated.193  As 
the new Florida law after the passage of Amendment 4 demonstrates, there are 
parallels between the felon disenfranchisement problem and earlier efforts to 
limit the African-American vote (which ultimately resulted in the creation of 
  
 187. See Iowa Exec. Order No. 70 (Jan. 14, 2011); Weigel, supra note 179. 
 188. See Mazzei, supra note 18. 
 189. Howell v. McAuliffe, 788 S.E.2d 706, 710 (Va. 2016).  Governor McAuliffe 
would later side-step the court’s action by signing (via autopen) individual commuta-
tions for all the individuals that would have been covered by his executive order.  See 
Newkirk, supra note 67. 
 190. See Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 537–39, 544. 
 191. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334–35, 338–39, 353 (1966). 
 192. Id. at 338.  
 193. See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., supra note 1. 
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the VRA Section 5 solution).194  In the 1960s, racist politicians could deploy 
multiple means of evading efforts to give voting rights to African-Americans, 
including poll taxes, unfairly administered literacy tests, and dubious moral 
character requirements.195  Similarly, jurisdictions that want to limit felon par-
ticipation today can do so in ways other than adopting more explicitly restric-
tive policies.  They can elevate certain misdemeanors to felonies, increase pro-
bation and parole supervision periods, or mandate that all court fees and fines 
be paid off before rights are restored.  Covering a jurisdiction and requiring a 
justification for voting-related changes might have made some of these eva-
sions more difficult prior to Shelby County.196 
Still, even before the Court negated Section 5, it was clear the VRA would 
have to be adjusted to deal with new forms of restrictions that had disparate 
racial effects.  Many of the states that passed stricter voting laws prior to Shelby 
County did not fall under Section 5 coverage.197  Some litigants made efforts 
to bring these restrictions – including felon disenfranchisement laws – under 
the umbrella of Section 2 of the VRA.  Section 2 of the VRA provides that  
[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, 
or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political sub-
division in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the 
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or 
color.198   
Courts have long held that Section 2 authorizes certain disparate impact 
claims.199  Given the uniformly disproportionate effect of felon disenfranchise-
ment laws, these regulations would thus seem ripe for challenge under Section 
2.  However, four federal appellate courts have already rejected these efforts.  
Three – the First, Second, and Eleventh Circuits – have held that Section 2 of 
the VRA was not meant to apply to statutes that restrict felon voting.200  The 
other court to address the issue, the Ninth Circuit, ruled that felon disenfran-
chisement claims were potentially cognizable under Section 2, but only if there 
was some evidence of intentional discrimination in the administration of crim-
inal justice.201  With the Supreme Court seemingly uninterested in aggressively 
  
 194. See Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 536–37 (describing early efforts by Southern 
states to limit the African-American vote). 
 195. See generally Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309–13 (describing at length the elab-
orate efforts by Southern states to deny African Americans the franchise). 
 196. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks & Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reau-
thorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–246, § 5, 120 Stat. 577, 
580–81 (2006). 
 197. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election, 553 U.S. 181, 185–86 (2008). 
 198. 52 U.S.C § 10301(a) (2018).  
 199. See, e.g., Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 200. Id.; Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 310 (2d Cir. 2006); Johnson v. Governor 
of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1234 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 201. Farrakhan, 623 F.3d at. 993–94. 
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supporting voting rights202 and no current circuit split on the issue, Section 2 
claims have little plausibility at this moment. 
With Section 2 likely unavailing, a more realistic attack on racialized ef-
forts to restrict felon voting rights would presumably need to resuscitate and 
apply Section 5.  However, the layering of racial and political polarization has 
created new complications to devising tests that pinpoint the racial motives be-
hind actions and behind vote restrictions.  In Table 4, we assess the relationship 
between a state’s racial composition, its political leanings, and its disenfran-
chisement policies.203  As the data show, a 10% increase in black population 
and a 10% increase in support for Trump are associated with similar increases 
in the probability that a state adopts a severe felon disenfranchisement law.  In 
other words, it is difficult to distinguish between racial and partisan motives 
when it comes to disenfranchisement.  This confusion could easily provide fed-
eral courts with an excuse to avoid intervening.  If gaming voter qualifications 
for political advantage is simply part of the rough and tumble of partisan poli-
tics, then some might regard the discriminatory impact of disenfranchisement 
laws as a mere political question better dealt with by the legislative and exec-
utive branches than by the courts.204 
 
  
 202. See, e.g., Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2508 (2019) (holding that 
political gerrymandering claims are not justiciable under Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 203. To arrive at these figures, we ran ordered logit models with state disenfran-
chisement policy as the dependent variable and “state percentage black” and “percent-
age voted for Trump” as independent variables, respectively.  We then calculated the 
mean increase in the probability of adopting a particular disenfranchisement policy if 
each of the independent variables rose by ten percentage points.  For details on ordered 
logit models, see Max Lu, Determinants of Residential Satisfaction: Ordered Logit vs. 
Regression Models, 30 GROWTH & CHANGE 264, 271–73 (1999). 
 204. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507. 
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TABLE 4  
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE BLACK POPULATION, SUPPORT FOR 
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-1.47% -17.43% -2.13% 6.30% 10.84% 3.90% 
N = 51, FD = Felon Disenfranchisement, Prob. = Probability 
 
CONCLUSION 
The harsh reality of felon voting rights is that progress may stall out in 
some states even as there are gains in others.  It is not out of the question that 
states completely controlled by the Democrats could end some forms of disen-
franchisement, while those controlled by Republicans might retain draconian 
laws or even extend them.  And even when neither party completely controls 
the state government, a governor can act unilaterally by taking executive ac-
tions.  While permanent disenfranchisement may be curbed to some degree by 
Eighth Amendment challenges, this is undoubtedly a limited tool in the face of 
a substantially larger problem.  Moreover, the breakdown in the bipartisan con-
sensus over voting rights – combined with increased partisan motivation to gain 
advantage by gaming the eligibility rules – could potentially exacerbate the 
situation.  It would not be surprising to see politicians increasingly wield felon 
disenfranchisement laws as a cudgel against opposing partisans.  Without 
stronger tools to protect voting rights, ex-felons and the disadvantaged com-
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